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Legislative Drafting. A New Approach. By Sir William Dale. London:
Butterworths, 1977. Pp. xix, 341.

It is hard for an American to evaluate a book that criticizes the
drafting of statutes in the United Kingdom on the basis of "the
continental system" as exemplified by France, Germany, and Sweden.
Being unfamiliar with the latter and only generally familiar with
the former, I can only comment on the author's analysis and recommendations in the light of American experience.
Legislative tradition being what it is, the title of the book gives
little hint that the author is focusing on much-neglected aspects
of legislative drafting, such as the allocation of drafting functions,
the deployment of personnel, and the procedures that interlink them,
while giving minimal attention to the materials usually found in
books on "legislative drafting". Persons interested in the specifies of
what a legislative draftsman should put into a statute must look
elsewhere. Since almost two-thirds of the book is devoted to extended statutory quotations and much of the material in the remainder is of only marginal relevance, Sir William has little opportunity for more than sweeping generalization. However, some
of his generalizations are well worth pondering. The legal profession is indebted to him for delving into an aspect of legislative
drafting that is known to few and only rarely written about': the
organizational and procedural context in which legislative drafting
takes place.
Sir William's main complaint against English statutes is that
they are hard to read and understand. To provide examples, he
quotes extensively from copyright laws, family laws, labour laws,
limitation of actions laws, and several other kinds. Unfortunately,
the typical reader, like this reviewer, is unlikely to rise to the
challenge of verifying their total usefulness, because Sir William
has burdened him with excessively protracted examples. (I would
have preferred fuller drafting principle and more persuasive recommendations.) Even so, the reader seems justified in concluding
that the persons who put together statutes in the United Kingdom
and elsewhere would do well to emulate some of the practices
typical of France, Germany, and Sweden.
'E.g., Dickerson (ed.), ProfessionalizingLegislative Drafting Experience (1973).
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Sir William is at his best when tracking down deficiencies in
English statutes, the most important of which seem to be the
following:
(1) a general lack of clarity;
(2) the failure to disclose at the beginning of a statute its basic
thrust;
(3) the needless introduction of qualifications and conditions
before a general rule is stated;
(4) the inclusion of unnecessary words and other extraneous
matter;
(5) excessively long and involved sections;
(6) too many definitions and too much reliance on them or on
"interpretation" clauses;
(7) too many provisos;
(8) too many and too much reliance on schedules;
(9) unnecessary repetition;
(10) unnecessarily convoluted or otherwise bad arrangement;
(11) too much incorporation by reference; and
(12) too much cross-referencing.
In his opinion, the United Kingdom's trouble is largely attributable
to "a system under which the drafting is entrusted to specialist technicians", which tends "to produce texts of growing legal technicality,
complexity, and length". This calls for a "change of style"Y The
continental style of codification is a good way to accomplish this,
because it helps to extricate statutes from "the matrix of the
common law", 4 thus making way for a more felicitous style and
a more accessible arrangement. 5 "A more profound change is also
desirable: a determination to seek the principle, to express it, and
to follow up with such detail, illuminating and not obscuring the
principle, as the circumstances require.""
If Sir William's evaluation of English statutes is correct (and
from the evidence he has assembled I have no cause to deny it),
much of what he says makes good sense. At least, it fits with what
Professor Mellinkoff and others have concluded about legal gobbledygook: that most of it is an unnecessary -hangover from times (1)
2p. 333.

3Ibid.
4p.335.
5Itis not clear whether Sir William advocates not only immediate adoption

of the codification style but also ultimate adoption of a general codification
program: see, e. g., p. 335.
GIbid.
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when Old English or Middle English was being enriched to meet
legal needs by words or phrases from Norman French, Old Norse,
Celtic, or Latin, many of which persist today only in the language
of the law while having usable plain-English counterparts,7 (2)
when draftsmen pitted their wits against unfriendly, precedentoriented judges who viewed statutes as unseemly encroachments
on the common law," or (3) when the language of litigated instruments was thought to be judicially sanctified. Certainly, the emancipation of statutes from these still lingering judicial prejudices
should be aggressively sought. Another cause of legislative obscurity
may be serious inbreeding in an office that, having a monopoly on
legislative drafting, has failed to maintain a sensitive editorial
point of view.
Sir William also points out that there is more to clarity than
a readable style; there is sound arrangement. It is in this respect
that English statutes seem the most deficient. First, it is hard to
find and understand core statements of what English statutes are
requiring. Such statements, of course, belong at or near the beginning. They should also be sufficiently self-contained that the
reasonably knowledgeable reader can get their gist without turning
to another statute or even to another part of the same statute.
Nevertheless, English statutes, being the product of highy skilled
lawyers, have a high -level of logical coherence.
Sir William's laudable skill at uncovering "the mischief" is not
fu.ly matched by his skill in tracing efficient causes. Of course, he
is on solid ground in attributing much of bad legal style to the
common law matrix within which English statutes still exist, and to a
devotion to its conceptual structure and traditional terminology.
These matters, he thinks, can be cured by switching to codification,
or at least to its style.
Sir William finds the English lawmaking process defective in
that "there is no examination or revision by a central body of
experts, and there is no scrutiny by working committees of Parliament";9 that is, the process lacks the "revising stage" provided in
France, Germany, and Sweden. He prefers the continental system,
in which the initial drafting is done by persons who are fully
knowledgeable in substantive policy without necessarily having the
7 Mellinkoff, The Language of the Law (1963), chs. 2 and 3.

8Conard, New Ways to Write Laws (1947) 56 Yale LJ.458. See also Dickerson,

The Fundamentals of Legal Drafting (1965), 32.

9P.335.
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expertise peculiar to legislative drafting. This tends to avoid
"legalese" and produce clarity. How the latter is achieved he does
not explain. Presumably, the general run of lawyer or policy expert
in those continental countries is highly literate and, if untainted by
legislative drafting expertise, tends to write clearly. The approach
has certainly not worked in the United States, where writing inadequacies lurk even in high places and where the traditional approach
of lawyers (and laymen trying to write as lawyers) is to emulate
the most turgid products of the past.
Sir William accordingly recommends a three-phase system: (1)
initial drafting by persons other than drafting specialists; (2) revision by an Advisory Law Council, independent of government, consisting of. judges, practitioners, a professor of law, professors of
literature, members of consumer councils, representatives of local
bodies or authorities, and a rapporteur,in consultation with ministers and civil servants, followed by revision by parliamentary committees; and (3) debate and passage by Parliament.
At this point, I lose touch. The critical step for Sir William is
the second (revisionary) phase, during which the ideal of clear
drafting, launched during the first phase, would be consummated.
Somehow during this second phase, the special legislative drafting
skills needed for adequate legislation but withheld during the first
phase would be supplied. How? "The Law Council should possess
sufficient expertise, and authority, and be sufficiently catholic in
its composition, to command attention, respect and confidence."'
Here, Sir William begs the question by taking, for granted the
existence, ready availability, and particular contributions of persons
whose technical expertise is needed for adequate legislation. What
is this expertise, who has it, and when and how is it to be introduced? General olarity is introduced in the first phase by persons
freed of the common law tradition. But is this all? Beyond it, I find
only a vacuum.
On the one hand, Sir William concedes that legislative "experts
of ... high but specialised skills [that is, trained draftsmen]" can
produce "a general consistency of method and style"," and that
they have "unique command of the needed skills". 2 In other words,
these legislative experts, who are to be omitted during the first
phase, can do something that is needed for adequate legislation, and
10 P. 336.
11 P. 337.
12 P. 338 [emphasis added].
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only they can do it. I fail to see how a Law Council constituted as
Sir William would constitute it would or could provide the necessary
ingredient. Of course, it is possible that I have underestimated the
rank and file of English judges, practitioners, professors, and representatives. In the United States, such groups have amply exhibited their drafting inadequacies.
On the other hand, Sir William says that maybe the English do
not need specialized draftsmen after all. They can return the responsibility for legislative drafting to the ministries "so long as
there is a Law Council to maintain consistency and the required
standards". 3 What specific standards are these?
But if drafting "experts of this kind, of high but specialised
skills, scientists in their field, tend like most scientists to develop
an esoteric language and method, understood by the initiated, but
obscure to the many",14 what assurance is there that drafting in the
ministries will not fall into the hands of non-legislative scientific
specialists who will inject their own brands of technical jargon?
What Sir William calls a "new" approach has been common practice
in Washington for many years and, in its American environment, it
has been a dismal failure. Perhaps he should rest his case on his
initial explanation, because the obfuscation process is more closely
linked to unwholesome aspects of the common law matrix (or
possible administrative inbreeding) than to dangers inherent in
specialization.
I remain skeptical of the efficacy of the proposed Law Council
for achieving the desired clarity. Although important legislation in
Washington is normally reviewed in a series of rigorous examinations made from many points of view, these examinations remain
almost wholly substantive. Indeed, there is nothing in the present
Congressional system to guarantee that an important piece of legislation is drafted, reviewed, or even seen by a-person with drafting
expertise.
For me, Sir William's complaints come down to this: despite
his professed admiration for its personnel and contributions to
logical coherence, he does not like the way the Parliamentary
Counsel's office has been drafting statutes. Even assuming that his
dissatisfaction is well founded, I see nothing relating to clarity in
the English system (which has much to commend it) that could
not be as fully cured by reforming the office's editorial attitude with
13 Ibid.
14 Pp. 337-38.
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particiflar regard to arrangement, cross-referencing, referential
amendment, and some matters of style, without undertaking a comprehensive codification program or transferring basic lawmaking
functions to other agencies.
In the modern world, legislative drafting specialists are indispensable. Indeed, I surmise that a more thorough investigation
would show that even the "continentals", in addition to being untainted by the common law, either have attained a higher degree
of literacy or have somehow tucked away in the various ministries
specialists in the drafting of legal instruments who have not been
officially recognized as such. On the other hand, Sweden's statutes,
in their perpetuation of the false imperative, undesignated paragraphing, inconsistencies of expression, and unnecessary words,
suggest that there is room for an even higher level of professionalism.
In any event, continental statutes such as these should be evaluated
also on the basis of other considerations than readability.
For one with an American background, it is hard to believe that
any significant number of effective reviewers could be judges. Again,
I may be underestimating the quality of legal talent on the continent or in the United Kingdom. Even so, it would be risky to import an apparently successful foreign program without ascertaining whether the quality of personnel needed for success can be
assumed to exist in the new environment. It certainly does not exist
in the United States.
The legal professions of both countries would benefit greatly
from a heavy dose of formal instruction in legal drafting. The gap
is not filled by Sir William's bland assumption that all it takes to
make a good draftsman is the general ability to write clearly and
knowledge of "the facts and the law on the subject".15 That such a
person "can pick up legislative drafting without difficulty""' is contradicted at least by American experience, which supports a minimum training period of several years. What Sir William seems to
overlook is that many legislative drafting problems transcend style
and readability and even'knowledge of the substantive law and the
facts.
It is also possible that sending bills to parliamentary coniittees before (instead of after) initial consideration by the House of
Commons would make possible fuller review before the bills legislatively congeal.
15 P. 339.
1 Ibid.
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Sir William is careful not to identify the "continental system"
with the avoidance of legislative detail, inasmuch as detail is common in at least the German brand of code. Accordingly, he does not
recommend that the English necessarily eschew it. On the other
hand, some critics of English legislation have viewed this as a
feasible alternative, lured by the undeniable fact that a complicated statute is harder to read than a less complicated one.
When testifying before the Renton Committee, I was asked if I
favored the "contiental" system of sticking to generalities. I said
that the matter is normally beyond the control of the draftsman
and that, in the United States at least, the outcome is determined
in each case, not by broad political theory, but by how far the
legislature is willing in the particular circumstances to trust the
judgment and good faith of the administrator or the courts. Unfortunately, in the United States this trust is highly tentative. Even
acts that begin their lives as broad mandates tend to become deeply
scarred or heavily cluttered with detailed amendments. The main
road to clearer statutes probably hes elsewhere.
Sir William's comments on statutory interpretation seem to
overstate the legislative draftsman's appropriate concern with that
area, much of which deals with the pathology of badly drafted
statutes and is therefore irrelevant to drafting principles whose
application obviates the need for curative interpretation. Also, I
doubt that a "change in the style of statutory drafting is likely to
require an overhaul of accepted rules of interpretation"," even
assuming that "style" includes the avoidance of detail. His assertion
seems valid only so far as "statutory interpretation" is stretched
beyond the courts' cognitive function to include delegated legislation by them. But supplementation is hardly explication; even
though avoidance of legislative detail normally entails judicial (or
administrative) supplementation, Sir William's statement remains
misleading. So far as interpretative principles relate to cognition,
the draftsman's interest is confined largely to areas in which the
courts have been unfriendly under the doctrine of "strict construc18
tion".
His analysis also suggests that the only effective escape from
English judges' alleged literalism in the interpretation of statutes
is to adopt, in each case, " 'a construction which would promote the
17 p. 292.
18 See Dickerson, The Interpretation and Application of Statutes (1975), 8
and 205-12.
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general legislative purpose' ",9 coupled with compliance with Lord
Scarman's recent plea that the "judge must be given a much
wider discretion than he has now in the choice of evidence from
which to infer the intention of Parliament",2 which in Sir Wiliam's
view includes resort to "Parliamentary material". Such a choice
overlooks a third alternative: taking account of the tempering that
language normally receives at the hands of external context.21 Ironically, resort to parliamentary material, which hardly qualifies as
context, 22 tends to undermine the draftman's incentive to better
drafting. Why strain for perfection in a legal instrument that the
court will subordinate to the largely uncontrdlled material of legislative history?
Despite these reservations, Sir Willian has performed a valuable
service in drawing attention to the fact that we need to know not
only what a good statute should look like but what organizational
devices and procedures are best fitted for producing -it. May his
book inspire further investigations in this neglected area.
Reed Dickerson*

'9 P. 339. Dale is apparently quoting from the U.K. Law Commission, The
Interpretationof Statutes (1969), but he gives no page reference.
20 P. 340.
2
1 Supra, note 18, ch. 9.
2

Ibid., 138-62.

* Professor of Law, Indiana University (Bloomington).

